Civilian Oversight and the LAPD free essay sample

Los Angles, and Washington, DC. Since that time, the Cleveland oversight movement has not lost any momentum. Indeed, over one hundred different oversight boards exist, covering law enforcement agencies that serve nearly one-third of the American population (ICP, 2000). According to Police Chief Magazine, about eighty-percent of the nations largest agencies have some form of civilian oversight (Barrow, 2003). It Is Interesting to note, today, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (ICP) lauds the implementation of civilian oversight.Conversely, forty years ago when the notion f civilian oversight was initially proposed, the ICP was one of its most vehement opponents. In a critique oaf Harvard Law Review article regarding police review boards, the ICP wrote, [citizen oversight] Is so violated of sound administrative concept as to be untenable. Any attempt of private groups to superimpose a police review board lends itself to the impairment of government through vigilantism, harassment, and usurpation of the legally constituted law enforcement personnel (Nacelle, 1965, p. ). So strong was the contempt for the Idea, LAP Chief Davis went so far as to call Cleveland oversight, the offspring of the communist conspiracy (Nacelle, 1965, p. 1). To be fair, during the same timeshare, the other side of the aisle was Justas contentious. In the book, Law Enforcement: The Matter of Redress, published shortly after the Watts riots in 1965, the UCLA called for public hearings of police officers accused of misconduct, where the complainant (or other interested parties) could cross-examine the officer (1969, p. 13).Clearly, it is not a communist -conspiracy to allow members of the public to participate in the implant process. Nor is advocating public witch trials of police officers alleged of misconduct the answer. While cooler heads may have prevailed, the debate over the value of civilian oversight continues. Consequently, the aim of this paper is to consider the role of civilian oversight in policing, examine its effectiveness, and the inherent problems associated with Investigating oversight agencies, in particular how sustain rates affect client oversight agencies.Civilian Oversight While there is no denying that the conversation over citizen oversight is worthwhile, before any discussion can take place, we must first define what civilian oversight 1 is. Although oversight allows various means of civilian involvement (as noted by Samuel Walker), most civilian oversight mechanisms have been particularly concerned with complaints against the police (2001 In fact, the legal definition of civilian oversight is, a municipal body composed of civilian representatives charged 1 OFF misconduct by police officers (Legal Dictionary Online, 2011).As with most legal definitions however, interpretation is key. In this instance, in regards to police policy orientation, what does citizens charged with the investigation mean? In other words, what is the role of citizen oversight? Role of Oversight in Policing While the nature of civilian involvement in the complaints process varies substantially between oversight agencies, as already noted, the role of civilian oversight is most oftentimes focused with complaints. However, the nature of how oversight is implemented varies between oversight agencies. According to Samuel Walker, four types of oversight are most common: Citizen Review Board: This type of oversight system is comprised wholly of civilians, and is given full responsibility for achieving and investigating complaints. If the complaint is sustained, the board submits recommendations for disciplinary or policy action. Police Review/Citizen Oversight: Under this type of oversight system, Police Officers receive, review, and investigate complaints. Any subsequent disciplinary or policy recommendations are also made by police officers.Oversight is limited too civilian (or a board of civilians) overseeing and/or reviewing the complaint investigation and findings. Police Review/ Citizen-police Appeal Board: Under this type of oversight system, complaints are viewed and investigated by police officers within their departments Internal Affairs division (DAD). If substantiated, AD will make recommendations to the Chief of Police. Complainants not satisfied with the outcome of the investigation can appeal to the oversight agency for a review.Independent Civilian Auditor: Under this type of oversight, police departments still investigate complaints, but an independent citizen auditor is assigned to review the departments complaint process. Once the audit has concluded, the auditor submits their findings and recommendations as needed. Additionally, some Auditors (such as those used in the City of Los Angles) have been authorized to review the practices and procedures used by the department. For instance, the Los Angles Police Commission recently assigned an independent auditor after receiving complaints that patrol cars were parking in red zones during non-emergency calls.Obviously, there are examples of civilian oversight agencies that do not fit neatly into one category or another. Many agencies could (and have), adopted hybrid versions of the above mechanisms as a means of resolving citizen complaints. For instance, interestingly, some agencies, such as the Los Angles Sheriffs Department, voluntarily requested oversight to review their policies and practices in a proactive attempt to mitigate risk of misconduct. While at the other end of the spectrum, a federal Judge mandated that the Los Angles Police Department be monitored as part of its consent decree following the Rafael Perez scandal.Effectiveness While the issue of whether cities should establish some form of citizen oversight may have already been settled, what remains to be answered is, are these oversight agencies effective? Given that the basic function of an oversight body is to receive and investigate complaints, determine their legitimacy, and impose sanctions, the obvious measure of effectiveness would be, does civilian oversight ensure a greater reception and a higher quality investigation of complaints, hence the likelihood of an increased sustain rate.While there is no shortage of academic literature or opinion s upport their claims. In fact, according to Mohr, in her study on performance indicators for civilian oversight, the only published study to scientifically evaluate the verbal effectiveness of an individual civilian oversight agency is Burdens Evaluating citizen oversight of police. (Mohr, 2007, p. 21) One explanation for the lack of empirical data is the multitude of variables that may be involved (e. G. What type of complaint was received (serious of frivolous), who received it, how was it received, etc. . As Samuel Walker points out, it is extremely difficult to Judge whether the sustain rate of complaints is different with or without oversight, because oversight may impact the kind of complaints received (2001). For these reasons, Perez, in his kook, Common Sense About Police Review, offers three indices that may be better suited for measuring the effectiveness of civilian oversight (1994). Integrity Legitimacy Learning Perez argues, since the majority of review systems focus on complaints, in essence, civilian oversight agencies are adjudicative bodies (p. 2). As such, the first manner in which to Judge the effectiveness of civilian oversight is not to look at sustain rates, but to consider its adjudicative function, specifically the Integrity of the system is the system fair, thorough, and objective (p. 72). For instance, rather than asking if he mechanism makes it easier to file complaints or predicts increased findings of police misconduct, the better questions to ask are, Was the complainant given an opportunity to voice their concern? Was the amount of evidence collected appropriate?Were the officers treated fairly and legally? Were the findings objective? Because complaints regarding the police are most oftentimes highly emotionally charged the complainants (and the police) notion of fairness and objectivity is usually directly related to the outcome of the complaint. Hence, since most complaints are not sustained (by any kind of review mechanism), most implants are not satisfied with the oversight mechanism. Consequently, Perez s uccessfully argues that along with integrity, any evaluation of effectiveness should be balanced with legitimacy (p. 74).Legitimacy is directly related to the publics perception of both the oversight agency and the police. A community must have faith in the legitimacy of its public institutions, particularly the police. Without community-based support, no modern police organization could maintain order in mass society. (p. 75). Because the legitimacy of the complaints process (and the law enforcement institution as a whole), lives and dies on the perception of the complainant and the public, it is imperative that the public view the actions of the oversight agency as rigorous and transparent.History reminds us, when misconduct causes the community to lose its trust in the police, the perception of malpractice ultimately becomes more important than the actual amount of real abuse. If the perception (fanned by the media), is that the oversight agency is lacking or secretive, it can easily lose its legitimacy. Given its extreme importance, how then does one measure an institutions legitimacy? As part of its community-based policing program, the oversight body (or the police agency) could initiate surveys of public confidence, or conduct exit-interviews of both the complainants and police officers.